The paper advances the view that while free trade and trade liberalization under the multilateral framework is the first best policy on purely theoretical grounds, the theory of the second best in the form of regional, plurilateral and bilateral free trade arrangements is at work in the real world. The methodology of economics is an important discipline; however, dysfunctional and power-structured multilateralism, heterogeneous economic structures and diverse development paths and levels render a political economy approach based on strategic pragmatism more realistic. In addition, empirical results have demonstrated that regional, plurilateral and bilateral free trade agreements can offer benefits to complement and supplement multilateralism provided these arrangements are consistent with the rules of the World Trade Organisation.
1

*
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Linda Low*
The paper advances the view that while free trade and trade liberalization under the multilateral framework is the first best policy on purely theoretical grounds, the theory of the second best in the form of regional, plurilateral and bilateral free trade arrangements is at work in the real world. The methodology of economics is an important discipline; however, dysfunctional and power-structured multilateralism, heterogeneous economic structures and diverse development paths and levels render a political economy approach based on strategic pragmatism more realistic. In addition, empirical results have demonstrated that regional, plurilateral and bilateral free trade agreements can offer benefits to complement and supplement multilateralism provided these arrangements are consistent with the rules of the World Trade Organisation.
The main objective of this paper is to reinforce the view that while free trade and trade liberalization under the multilateral framework is the first best policy, in the real world, the theory of the second best in regional, plurilateral and bilateral free trade arrangements is at work. A brief overview is germane to capture prevailing trends and developments in trade liberalization, related investment facilitation and other factor flows and economic integration, as the paradigm appears to have moved from multilateral and regional to plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements (see Radtke, and others, eds., 2002) . After this stocktaking at various levels and modalities, some interpretations of the economic and geopolitical nuances and impact of trade policy in the broader context of foreign economic policy by various actors in the global economy are attempted in section II. Section III focuses on issues and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, from which conclusions, policy implications and prospects are drawn in section IV.
I. TRADE LIBERALIZATION: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Trade policy as a development policy is based on an advocacy of openness on an argument about economic efficiency and growth. It is also advocated in the belief that simple and open trade regimes offer a means of reducing governance problems by cutting the opportunities for discretionary policy and hence for corruption and arbitrariness in developing economies. An open trade regime also offers a way of conserving skilled labour in both the public and private sectors to meet challenges in education, administration, entrepreneurship and research (see OECD, 2003) . Across countries and periods, trade policy and regimes have evolved as:
1)
Import-substitution and commodity pessimism in the 1950s; 2)
Switching to export orientation in the 1960s and 1970s; 3)
To outward orientation in the 1980s; and 4)
Endogenous new growth theory and economic geography in the 1990s.
After 50 years of celebrating trade as the engine of growth and development, the belief and record of open trade policy as a development policy has not been emphatically based on objective empirical evidence ranging from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to private academic research. Nor has the remaking of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) been able to make more substantive claims for free trade since following the earlier rounds of tariff reduction the multilateral process appears to be in a jam and UNCTAD has taken a more sympathetic view of some forms of trade intervention.
The revised sentiment is because free trade accompanied by foreign direct investment (FDI) and the growing size of transnational corporations (TNCs) have become conduits for the anti-globalization backlash. Globalization whether from above, led by the industrialized developed world in the form of FDI and TNCs or from below with developing countries offering the resources and markets for globalization, defined as greater economic interdependence in seamless cross-border activities, is as old as internationalization. New globalization could be construed as the democratizaton of finance, information and technology with new information and communication technology (ICT) and the resulting new knowledge-based economy (KBE) as propellers of this process.
Running in parallel is global capitalism and its challenge for developing and emerging economies which are not ready for globalization in terms of financial structure and institutions. Neoliberalism further tries to influence and moderate Government intervention so successfully empricised in East Asia. Whatever the controversy with the wrong type of Government intervention leading to the 1997 Asian crisis, an equally sympathetic view of Government intervention rather than a complete free run to the market, especially in finance, may be posed.
No matter how free trade, globalization and global capitalism are intertwined, trade liberalization, investment facilitation, economic cooperation and integration in general, can be undertaken at the broadest multilateral level and in regional, plurilateral and bilateral configurations as subsets. There are pros and cons at each level, the choice of which depends on the relative efficacy and effectiveness and conditions and timing of the relevant arrangements (see Das, 2001 , Ikenberry, 2000 and World Bank, 2000 . Economic purists dictate free trade and multilateralism as the first best theory, implying the consistency of all other subset arrangements to multilateralism.
Multilateralism
The multilateral approach as in international institutions ranging from the United Nations to two key postwar "guardian angels" in international trade and finance respectively, GATT and its successor WTO, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has the merit of wide and encompassing representation. But this numerical strength can also be its weakness. Bargaining power and representativeness are as diverse as the heterogeneous nature of the structure and composition of such multilateral institutions.
A simple but realistic study of voting power in multilateral institutions shows patently that the Group of Five (G5), comprising the first five countries listed in table 1, all members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), dominates. Unsurprisingly, the United States of America is singularly dominant in both international and regional institutions, in Asia and Latin America, a close second in Africa (table 1) or second to Japan in funding the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, table 2). Decision-making in WTO is based on "one country one vote," almost by consensus though WTO democracy and inclusion lack the representativeness and participation of many small developing countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Features like the infamous "green room" and "non-papers" discussed at closed-door WTO meetings reflect power-based more than rule-based discrimination. Nevertheless, development issues representing a broader consensus have also made a mark in the form of the Doha Development Agenda.
Regionalism
The European Union (EU) has taken regional economic integration to the highest level culminating in a single market and monetary union in the form of a single currency, the euro by 2002, stopping short of political integration (see table 3 ). Whether as a response to the EU or a reflection of hemispherism, the progression of the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, appears to have stirred Asia's traditional inertia in regional initiatives.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started in 1967 for regional security, upgrading in 1977 to a preferential trading arrangement (PTA) and in 1993 with a ten-year timetable to ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Since the Asian crisis, AFTA has essentially stalled, ASEAN itself appears to have lost momentum Das, ed., 1992 and Kelegama, 1999) . Other initiatives in trade include the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation).
The Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) dialogue since 1995 involving India, Australia, Singapore, Oman, Kenya, South Africa and Mauritius, explores first-track Government-to-Government regional cooperation. A second-track dialogue among 23 Indian Ocean countries evolved as the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) in 1995. In 1997, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was 14-strong 1 from three continents, belonging to other regional groups Distinguishing between Government-to-Government politically driven regionalism and private sector and economic activity driven regionalization, table 4 summarizes the modalities, including regional production networks like growth triangles and the Japanese pioneer "flying geese" model of trade and investment and global production networks in automobiles and electronics spawned by American and European TNCs. Table 4 also identifies cross-regional arrangements as Asia-Pacific ties up with Europe (Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM) or Latin America (East Asia-Latin America Cooperation, EALAC). The menu is wide geographically, by political regionalism or economic regionalization, championed by Governments, the private sector or even on a tripartite basis involving the academia as in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). 2 Table 5 shows the changing phases of Asian regionalism, and table 6, patterns of cross-cutting membership. Old regionalism owed itself to the political realities of the 1950s and 1960s. The first realm of new regionalism since the flying geese model is open, liberal market integration, interregionalism, subregionalism and corporate integration with networking. New regionalism since 1997 covers a security-economic nexus, regional management, regional convergence and eventually financial integration. North-East and South-East Asian regionalism has converged with an East Asia-centred caucus and horizontal integration of financial and economic integration. Practical considerations dominate rather than ideological and theoretical in the demand for the institutional building of regional mechanisms. East Asia is not leading to de jure regional integration as in EU. ASEAN plus three (ASEAN 10 plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) is still designed to counter short term crises, problem-solving in orientation, specifically with 33 currency swaps signed since the Chiang Mai Initiative, not necessarily an overhaul of existing understanding of regionalism (see Henning, 2002) . ASEAN plus three is not yet a free trade area.
Clearly, efforts at new forms of Asian regionalism carrying a stronger political economy and security connotation, have been in response to changing geoeconomics and geopolitics, new ICT, the resulting new KBE and deregulation pushed by WTO and new trade rules. Intuitively, the larger the geoeconomic size and space, the more closely knit the economies by the natural trade partner hypothesis in terms of proximity and transaction costs, the higher the preexisting levels of trade and economic cooperation, the more symmetric are economies to economic shocks and disturbances and so forth, the better the chances for free trade pacts and economic integration. Table 7 shows an estimation of welfare gain or loss in various Asia-Pacific configurations. ASEAN plus three incorporating the two largest economies, Japan and China, clearly has the largest impact for most Asia-Pacific economies, except Australia which has motivated it to move closer to East Asia. Starting as something of a laggard, Asia appears to have built up a fast pace of regionalism within Asia and across the Pacific in the last few years. Such regionalism may in part be due to tensions and slow progress at the multilateral level, especially in the way developing and emerging economies perceive the WTO and its structure of power. Growing new Asian regionalism may in part be due to the sheer Asian growth dynamics and urge toward greater Asian identity and self-help since the Asian crisis. ASEAN plus three may well be considered a response to the US-opposed Asian Monetary Fund proposed by Japan 2003b) , although the former has a trade focus while the fund would have been a regional source of new liquidity.
ASEAN plus three has vastly altered the geoeconomics and geopolitics of ASEAN as a regional block. At one level, ASEAN prevails as the geographical value of South-East Asia with its enticements in terms of several bilateral trade arrangements involving ASEAN, as discussed in section II. Another view is that ASEAN appears marginalized by ASEAN plus three (Webber, 2001 ) which covers a larger economic space and potential (see table 7 ). It may even overshadow APEC though APEC is underpinned by the US. ASEAN and its ASEAN way of non-institutionalized informality, consensus and non-interference in domestic politics constitute both a strength and a weakness. Contagion and the herd instinct of markets in the Asian crisis should mean some regional macroeconomic management and stabilization. However, the ASEAN way and jealously guarded sovereignty fight shy of any supranational institutionalized approach and solutions to such problems. This overview concludes that new regionalism incorporating political economy and security considerations, driven as much by private sector activity, especially FDI and TNCs, is indeed rising. More than the dilemma of regionalism as roadblocks or building blocks for multilateralism (Bhagwati, 1993) , the consensus is tending toward a more positive construct of the new regionalism. Singularly loyal multilateralists from the US to Japan have acceded to a more consensual view to take a multi-track approach to trade liberalization so long as regional pacts are WTO-consistent and aim ultimately toward free trade.
Even the Doha Ministerial Declaration, while stressing commitment to WTO as the unique forum for global trade rule-making and liberalization, recognized that regional trading arrangements can play an important role promoting trade liberalization and expansion and fostering development. The 2001 World Bank Economic Outlook noted that regional trading arrangements have helped global trade to achieve a record high growth rate of 12.5 per cent in 2000 though the supporting evidence is not clear cut. Empirical evidence of the new regionalism in various approaches and modalities conducted by the global trade analysis project (Hertel, ed., 1997) indicates that it can be an adjunct to dysfunctional multilateralism without supplanting it.
Plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements
A nuanced Asian approach to regionalism has emerged, in time too, to exert some balance in the international political economy. Over and beyond regional trade arrangements, bilateral ones have found favour, especially in political economy and so-called new age deals beyond traditional tariff liberalization. The preference is to work with a smaller number of like-minded partners. New age trade pacts incorporate electronic-mediated customs procedures, electronic commerce (e-commerce), human resources development and security such as in the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement. Table 8 summarises these regional and bilateral trade arrangements growing apace in East and South-East Asia. Progress is also taking place in South Asia but at a slower pace.
II. GEOECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL NUANCES AND IMPACT
Unsurprisingly, the US remains the singular pivot in table 8. The US having to come to terms with EU integration, may have become less ideological, more Pushing competitive trade liberalization aggressively in bilateral and regional pacts does, however, weigh against a successful Doha round which would allow the US to roll back its agricultural support and tighten its safeguards to prevent their abuse. The US needs the WTO to press for agricultural liberalization and be an effective arbiter for dispute settlement and preferential pacts. Other big players, especially the EU, must cooperate to truly eliminate all tariffs on agricultural and industrial trade. But the EU common agricultural policy reforms seem elusive as alluded to by the Franco-German agreement in late 2002, notwithstanding the offer of the EU Trade Commissioner to abolish subsidies on agriculture on a reciprocal basis in May 2004. Table 8 shows very strong demonstration effects. Australia has tentatively approached Japan and the Republic of Korea, Canada has propositioned Japan and Hong Kong, China has shifted its position from a singular advocacy of multilateralism in exploratory free trade agreement talks with New Zealand and China. Even ASEAN is proving attractive, courted by China, Japan and India. The US, first in NAFTA and then FTAA, may seem to have broken its faith as the pioneer and founding father of GATT and instead, shown a tendency toward hub-and-spoke regionalism of the EU variety, given the wave of trade deals bonding the US and Asia. Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia are more interested after the US-Singapore free trade agreement was signed. Following the Bali bombing in October 2002 and another in Jakarta in July 2003, 4 South-East Asia is on full security alert. As the US led anti-terrorism war has spread to South-East Asia, APEC has cautioned the US not to sacrifice global trade by 3 The US Congress can vote for or against trade deals struck by the White House but not amend them after the procedural device was first granted in 1974 to five successive presidents with scarcely any debate until the fast-track authority lapsed in 1994. As a discipline, trade promotion authority has helped the US to complete all previous post-war GATT rounds. 4 While the bombing in Jakarta was attributed to Aceh's autonomy crisis, the incident followed by the escape of a Jemaah Islamiah (JI) member and the escape of two other militants from prison in Manila raised regional terrorist and security concerns in general.
deserting the region. Indeed, South-East Asian states which are committed to economic reform are rewarded by the US network of free trade agreements. 5 The US offered ASEAN an Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) announced on the sidelines of an APEC summit in Mexico. Simultaneously, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore are working on a Pacific-Three free trade agreement as a bridge between Latin America, the Pacific and Asia.
Whether China and India with their billion-plus populations will similarly activate regionally to challenge Japan as a putative hub in Asian hub-and-spoke regionalism is premature. Despite Indonesia, the ASEAN 10 with half the population of China and India cannot be summarily dismissed. ASEAN 10 has attracted as a buffer or by default, numerous bilateral trade arrangement offers. However, the ASEAN 10 is in too much of disarray to negotiate effectively as a group, a modality favoured by the EU. As such, the bilateral trade arrangements that Singapore has opted for should not be seen as breaking rank with ASEAN. Indeed, Singapore is trying to entice Germany into a bilateral trade pact, as its free trade proposal with the whole of EU is not progressing with speed. Pursuit of an agenda based on trade for development and integration for East Asia to seize widening opportunities in trade modalities, develop a behind-the-border development orientation and reinforce social stability with an equitable sharing of benefits, is not easy (Krumm and Kharas, eds., 2003).
Japan and the Republic of Korea's bilateral trade arrangement
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore are key players in Asian bilateral trade arrangements given their trade volumes. Japan's astonishingly deep, profound stagnation and socio-political problems in a lost decade may provoke a healthy evolution to a new economic business paradigm beneficial to the region as well. Finally convinced of an effective dual-track liberalization sanctioned by WTO, Japan has recognized regional trade arrangements as complementary to improving the multilateral trading system, as models for rule-making, combining plurality into a larger voice to advance multilateral negotiation stuck in deadlock 2003b) . A multilayered Japanese trade policy is necessary as WTO multilateralism is not enough for the swift and certain achievement of national revitalization. Approached first by Singapore and then the Republic of Korea, Japan seemed keen to use Singapore's openness and competitiveness to lock in reforms and prise open Japan's regulatory system, which has subtly shielded market access. The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement is innovative, involving traditional tariffs, rules of origin and new age dimensions. These include intellectual property 5 However, Singapore has resolutely denied that its bilateral trade agreement with the US was such a reward as negotiation started way before the September 11, 2001 attack. rights, competition policy, dumping, a conducive regulatory climate, investment codes for foreign investors, product standards, Government procurement, liberalization of financial services, telecommunications, tourism, media, broadcast, customs procedures, mutual recognition agreements, anti-dumping, safeguards and subsidies, human resources development, science and technology, e-Government, e-commerce and small and medium-sized enterprises.
The Republic of Korea has been even faster than Japan in such a realization as it approached Japan for a bilateral free trade agreement and going with others shown in table 8. However, Japan is hesitant because the Republic of Korea is also an agricultural economy.
Singapore's bilateral trade arrangement
As a small, open, resource-scarce city-state, being nimble, relatively sure-footed and exemplary in its free trade, economic management and efficiency, Singapore is also an enigma. Its model of a Government-led, developmental state presided over by Government-linked companies is neither foolproof nor sustainable in the new knowledge based economy. Singapore is trying to reinvent itself, redirect energies from the public sector to the private sector, turn regulators and bureaucrats into facilitators, paced and guided by the new economy. Stepping back for the Government-led Singapore model is not so simple. The political economy of privatization has far-ranging implications that cannot be explored here (see Low, 2001) . The hard truth is that the Singapore model has thus far cultivated a generation of followers rather than innovators in a meritocratic, rule-based environment. The future evolution of the Singapore model rests crucially upon how it performs over the next few years in terms of encouraging flexibility and innovation amongst its highly educated citizens.
Serial recession has hit Singapore since the US new economy "dot.com" crash in Small city-state Singapore is aggressively pursuing bilateral free trade arrangements as much for domestic industrial restructuring and reform as a degree of disillusion with ASEAN and AFTA has emerged 2003b) . Bilateral trade agreements fall under a broader, strategic foreign economic policy umbrella than mere trade policy. Together with many other initiatives and strategic policy thrusts focused around a growth and innovation framework, ranging from nurturing technology entrepreneurs or 'technopreneurs' to a life sciences cluster, Singapore hopes to raise its international competitiveness as cost competitiveness in the region erodes. International competitiveness and free trade remain its best options.
Singapore as a mature economy faces strong competition from both ASEAN and other newly-industrialising economies (NIEs), but especially from China in business logistics. Unable to compete on business cost and scale economies, its manufacturing exports have diversified and are largely anchored in mature and stable OECD economies. Its services remain more regionally-oriented. But the Asian crisis has shown ASEAN financial fragility and volatility which limits Singapore's scope and latitude as a regional hub. Regional drag has in fact, lowered its top ranking on AT Kearney's globalization index in 2000 to third in 2001. Malaysia has pointedly announced its desire to erode Singapore's regional domination in shipping and air services.
Given that longer term economic prospects are trending downward in South-East Asia vis-à-vis North-East Asia, with AFTA stalled, Singapore is directing its foreign economic policy to bilateral free trade arrangements, relying on its reputation and credibility as a soft power in influence and goodwill. Singapore goes one-on-one with all OECD economies and India, not in subordinated partnerships. Singapore chooses its bilateral free trade arrangement partners strategically, from among its largest trade partners in the OECD, which are relatively stable, and are well managed and more reliable compared to those in Asia to affect a political economy balance.
That Singapore's first five bilateral trade agreements were with OECD economies, namely, New Zealand, Japan, EFTA (European Free Trade Association), Australia and the US is unsurprising as part of its global networking enhancement which, inter alia, means benchmarking to standards and practices of the developed OECD economies. All five bilateral trade agreement partners urged Singapore toward a competition policy, which is a matter of time for its Government-linked companies to gear up for competition. The steep learning curve with OECD partners has given Singapore compensating gains in terms of first-comer advantages and insurance in hedging risk and uncertainty in and outside the region.
Singapore's bilateral free trade arrangements do not detract from its commitments in ASEAN. However, over time, its macroeconomic strategies and policies suited to a small, open city-state are diametrically the opposite of those in bigger, more ethnically diverse and complex ASEAN. Instead of getting globalization ready and internationally competitive, national issues impede trade liberalization and economic opening for most of ASEAN. Meant to generate a demonstration effect and anchor bilateral free trade arrangements partners' interest in ASEAN rather than weaken ASEAN solidarity, Singapore's bilateral free trade arrangements could invoke some constructive leadership to recharge and rebuild AFTA. Japan proposed the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership for the rest of ASEAN to replicate Singapore's effort. 6 Singapore has succeeded in spurring other ASEAN and Asian countries in bilateral free trade arrangements. However, its fast and furious pace will engender inevitable problems with different scope and rules of origin in the spaghetti bowl effect. Different rules of origin, not standardized even at the WTO level, under different bilateral free trade arrangements are used as bargaining chips and create "backdoor" effects. For instance, Singapore is a common denominator in both AFTA and the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement. Raw materials or semi-finished products undergo value-addition in accordance with the respective rules of origin to enable Singapore-made products to flow in both directions between ASEAN and Japan to evade barriers, something that would not have been possible without the Singapore link.
Moving from bilateral free trade agreements with OECD economies, Singapore's pursuit of those with India, the Republic of Korea and Jordan appears to balance both geoeconomics and geopolitics. Singapore is sensitive to pursuing one bilaterally with China, preferring to keep that an ASEAN-China bilateral free trade agreement. The Republic of Korea-Singapore bilateral free trade agreement announced in 2000 noted that Singapore was a candidate for bilateral free trade agreement negotiations after Chile and that it was difficult to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement with ASEAN 10 as a whole due to their different conditions. A joint study group started in 2003, had targeted to launch the bilateral free trade agreement at the APEC Leadership Summit in October 2003.
Negotiations for the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement were launched in 2003 with a joint study group report as a framework for subsequent negotiations. The 2002 joint study group envisaged that the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement would be structured as an integrated package of agreements. It includes a free trade agreement for trade in goods and services, investment promotion, an improved double taxation avoidance agreement, a more liberal air services agreement, open skies for charter flights, creation of the India-Singapore Fund and the setting up of a second India Centre in Singapore and tourism cooperation.
Singapore approached Jordan in 2003 for a free trade agreement to remove barriers and promote trade in services, goods, investment and e-commerce, including an investment framework agreement. The free trade agreement will provide the foundation for increased cooperation in areas such as e-Government, information technology, port management and tourism. Both countries will also work together on 6 Prime Minister Koizumi projected an East Asia free business zone which interestingly, is ASEAN plus three plus Australia and New Zealand. capacity building activities in third countries. Singapore is clearly reaching out very strategically even into the Middle East and one wonders how much the economics of such bilateral free trade agreements have been worked into the overall political economy and security framework. Based on pure economics, free trade agreements should ideally include Indonesia and Malaysia, but this is obviously politically difficult and AFTA remains the overarching platform.
III. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC CONTEXT
The November 2001 declaration of the fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha provides the mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects and other work, including issues concerning the implementation of the present agreements. Four Singapore issues brought in by the EU, on the back burner since the first Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1995, involving investment, competition, transparency in Government procurement and trade facilitation were reintroduced at the behest of EU and Japan. A crisis of confidence in the multilateral process alongside the anti-globalization backlash and many EU economies mired in slow or no growth did not provide the best environment for Cancun and the Doha Development Agenda even if those negotiations promised some US$ 600 billion in benefits. India appears to be the mirror image of France in being averse to trade liberalization. The developing third world camp also had Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia joining India, though China did not show its hand one way or the other as it kept itself busy with its WTO accession and the SARS outbreak.
As can be surmised, trade liberalization is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for growth and development. The debate about markets or state intervention should both more include efficient resource allocation and consumer welfare and trade facilitation.
The practical issues of trade liberalization are beyond the pure economic arguments for regional trade arrangements for extending most-favoured-nation (MFN) multilaterally to become effective building blocks to multilateralism. While inherent discrimination is the sin of bilateral and regional trade arrangements, it is increasingly clear that any single undertaking as for the four Singapore issues in Cancun with some 150 members is an issue in and of itself. The reality is geoeconomic and geopolitical variations and all sorts of geometry including cross-regional trade arrangements spanning all manner of economies encompassing political economy and security motivations and reasons. Discriminatory regional and bilateral trade agreements clearly constitute a second best theory, but may realistically get more and faster results. It is not an argument against the first best, free trade policy per se, but since the conditions for its effective and efficient working are compromised in the real world with dysfunctional multilateralism, a pragmatic approach is a valid alternative option.
Despite impressive progress even the Asian NIEs have fallen into disrepute with the 1997 crisis. In particular, crisis contagion due to capital flowing seamlessly expedited by ICT and speculative motives has resurrected and sharpened the north-south divide, aided and abetted by the anti-globalization backlash. Emerging economies still finding their feet in establishing institutional capacity to cope with global capitalism and all its portents (see Montiel, 2003) and least developed economies are the most vulnerable. In the short run, the "impossible trinity" of perfect capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and monetary autonomy cannot coexist in open macroeconomics. 7 Emerging economies and developing economies may be offered the widest umbrella under WTO, especially if special and differential treatment prevails under the Doha Development Agenda and round.
One clear outcome in the global economy is that competition has become more strident and stronger whether it is owed to globalization, ICT, KBE or WTO-induced liberalization. In turn, the corollary to furthering integration to enhance regional competitiveness has spawned various patterns and modalities of integration in East and South Asia, Latin America, North America and Europe. Africa and the rest of Central Asia and Middle East appear caught, for now, in the nooks and crevices of globalization. Not only is multilateralism changing, new regionalism has gone beyond economic to political economy and security issues. Interestingly, some members in established regional trade arrangements seem to be going their own way in bilateral trade arrangements; witness Singapore in ASEAN, Brazil in Mercusor and Mexico in NAFTA pursue bilateral pacts with Japan. Both ASEAN and Mercusor nevertheless remain valid as one in block-on-block negotiations; witness Mercusor-ASEAN or Mercusor-EU by 2005. Fault lines and new lines seem criss-crossing and it appears in some ways to be a strategic mind-game the participating countries are playing.
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Perfect capital mobility means elasticity of capital flows with respect to differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates. If Government allows the exchange rate to float, it can control money supply because it is not committed to buying or selling foreign exchange. That means changes in the monetary base can only happen at the Government's own initiative. On the other hand, if the Government wants to maintain a fixed exchange rate, it cannot sustain a money supply which would produce an interest rate different from world rate, because that would produce infinite excess demand or supply of foreign exchange reserves.
In truth, as globalization is a multilayered process with numerous institutionalized processes coexisting in rivalry or supplementing each other, there should be diversity and pluralism in regional and bilateral trade arrangements to a commensurate degree. Stretching trade agreements to monetary cooperation to deal with financial crises, new age pacts to take advantage of ICT for customs procedures and human resource development, are all part and parcel of the same logic of plurality. Within regional trade arrangements, plurilateral arrangements are further extensions of the same logic. Not all members in the same trade agreement may be interested in all issues and negotiations as in bovine and dairy plurilateral agreements. For the same reason, Singapore as a non-agricultural economy in ASEAN has the distinctive advantage of being an honest broker in helping others negotiate. It has no vested agricultural interests, but it is in agricultural ASEAN to be sensitive to the concerns of other members.
The benefits of trade liberalization, whether accruing from regional or regional trade arrangements, show generally positive results though there may be differentiated outcomes depending on membership configuration and composition as in table 7. Goto (2001) found that for an Asian trade bloc, the welfare of an Asian developing country would improve substantially though the favourable effect for Japan is relatively small because the rest of Asia's developing countries gain market access into Japan. The welfare of the US under an Asian free trade area is lower than that of pre-NAFTA, partially explaining its opposition to an East Asian trade block. The APEC free trade area has a dramatic impact on Asian developing countries and larger members like the US and Japan. Generally, a significant welfare-improving situation occurs for an APEC free trade area though to the detriment of non-APEC economies. Finally, in a completely free world trade case, the welfare level of members of major free trade areas substantially declines, but dramatically improves for the rest of the world.
A gravity model of bilateral trade involving 11 trading blocks mostly from the Asian-Pacific region found different preferential trade agreements vary remarkably across the region (Clarete and others, 2002) . Preferential trade agreements are categorized into three groups, those which foster intrablock trade in general like SAPTA, those which foster greater trade with trading partners worldwide like APEC and CER or reduce trade in general without changing their respective intrablock trade like AFTA and NAFTA. Interestingly, the first category has the propensity to expand Asia's trade, but not the second which adheres to open regionalism and may divert trade only toward its members. AFTA in the third category is usually deemed as trade-creating, but if they are observed as having not changed intrablock trade but reduced overall trade with the world, the explanation lies in the enlarged ASEAN (Clarete and others, 2002) . The new ASEAN members are less integrated with the world economy and there are inherent problems of widening versus deepening within the ASEAN 10 to delay integration and intrablock gains. In summary, preferential trade agreements have contributed significantly to trade expansion both at the global and regional levels, implying that they create rather than divert trade.
One empirical evaluation of the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement using a modified version of the dynamic global trade analysis project to capture short and long run impacts found significant favourable results for Japan (Hertel, and others, 2001 ). In particular, automatic customs procedures would play the most important role driving increases in merchandise trade. The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement would boost rates of return, thereby increase direct foreign investment in both economies. Some deterioration in the trade balance relative to the baseline over the medium term may arise, but it would improve in the long run with higher foreign income payments. The estimated global gains from the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement in excess of US$ 9 billion annually would accrue in bulk to Japan as it undertakes the most reforms to open up. New age components of the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement go beyond traditional tariff cuts and can be exemplary as a template. As Japan's first and Singapore's second free trade agreement, the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement would institutionalize regulatory and other policy reforms for both to remain attractive to capital and talents. But as noted, regardless of hard number crunching, less quantifiable strategic non-economic concerns are equally imperative.
IV. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS
Different levels of development, capacity, aspirations and expectations between developed and developing economies in the context of a more complex industrial structure with globalization, ICT, KBE and competition are realities which pure trade theories cannot assume away. In the final analysis, politics and political economy will dominate in public policy, including strategic trade and foreign economic policy decisions. While economic theory and ways of thinking in economic policy and decision-making terms remain paramount and desirable, politicians faced with vote maximization and short-run political cycles have to choose strategically between multilateralism, regionalism, plurilateral or bilateral trade arrangements. A multi-track approach is both logical and possible, as proven by singular multilaterists like the US and Japan changing track.
Developing and emerging economies fresh out of the Asian crisis are caught in a political and security post-9/11 terrain which affects business confidence and transaction costs. Last, but not the least, Asia was besieged by health epidemics, SARS and more recently avian influenza. Some intervention in both trade and in markets generally appears justifiable, especially when political economy and social issues are taken into account as well as the more nebulous concept of human security. The overall message is, however, that with intraregional trade already in bloom and gaining strength before the Asian crisis, accelerated more by China's opening than ASEAN's, it is logical to revisit trade as the engine of recovery and growth in an integrated Asia. Both East and South-East Asia are emerging in their own ways to challenge the developed country-dominated international political economy.
Finally, trade policy and liberalization constitute only necessary but not sufficient conditions to growth and development. Trade facilitation and competition are in fact flanking policies, beyond trade considerations based on traditional comparative advantage considerations. Whether it is a recovering Japan, China, India or the ASEAN 10 that will provide leadership in furthering integration in the region, the geoeconomic and geopolitical implications have to be differentiated. Even a small city-state Singapore has contributed in some manner to bilateral trade arrangements going outside of the region. In the final analysis, while the economics of trade liberalization and economic integration remain the underlying logic of the various modalities of trade liberalization and economic integration, it should be strategically tempered with pragmatism as a second best policy.
